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While many studies research on the bidding contest, several studies have assessed the impact of 
the white knight's bid on common stock returns. However, these studies focus on the reaction of 
the market to a single decision. In this paper, we are interested in both the short-run effect of 
management's decision to make a white-knight bid and the long-term cumulative effect made by 
management. As the first paper to research on the motivation of the white knight and on the 
factors that affect its market reaction, we place the white knight's decision to enter the control 
contest in a broad context. Our hypothesis is that poor governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure may lead to both poor management and thus a decision to join the bidding contest with 
an overpaid price. We employ a unique hand-collected dataset on firm characteristics, 
governance mechanisms and ownership structure for the bidding pairs with white knights. Our 
results show that board size, tenure average, the ownership held by directors and executives as a 
group and institutional ownership have an important effect on abnormal returns. However, we 
find no significant effect of financial strength and ownership structure on the likelihood of a 
white knight takeover attempt. Instead, we find that striving for the market power in its industry 
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A white knight refers to an individual or firm that comes to the aid of another firm to help 
prevent an unwelcome takeover. It is a friendly bidding firm that actively sought by a target 
which is resisting acquisition by a hostile bidding firm. In September 2011, Canadian specialty 
chipmaker Zarlink Semiconductor appealed in public for a white knight to best a hostile $561 
million takeover offer from U.S. rival Microsemi, and was in talks with at least 15 potential 
buyers. But unfortunately, there was no white knight showing up and Zarlink Semiconductor was 
finally acquired by Microsemi in the end of year 2011; Allergan Inc., a global specialty 
pharmaceutical firm, is still struggling to contact lots of companies including Sanofi and Johnson 
& Johnson to see if either would be interested in acquiring the Botox maker after receiving an 
unsolicited $45.7 billion bid from Valeant Pharmaceuticals Inc since the April, 2014.  
In the targets’ eyes, even though not all takeovers are hostile, they will consider that some firms 
may not be ideal to move the company in a direction where they don't want to go for or the 
management of the targets may feel that they’ll get replaced or threatened by the hostile bidders 
in the near future.  However, in view of the white knights, existing research shows that 
participation in an acquisition generally does not confer substantial benefits on bidding 
shareholders (Banerjee and Owers, 1992; Niden, 1993; Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1988). In fact, 
they usually have to overpay even more greatly for the market price while attempting to outbid 
the hostile rival. So, we cannot help asking this question: what is the motivation for the white 
knights?  
Several studies have assessed the impact of the white knight's bid on common stock returns. 
However, these studies focus on the reaction of the market to a single decision. Acquisitions are 
among the largest and most readily observable forms of corporate investment, which should be 
considered as a prudent decision of the management.  In this paper, we are interested in both the 
short-run effect of management's decision to make a white-knight bid and the long-term 
cumulative effect made by management. As the first paper to research into the motivation of the 
white knight, we place the white knight's decision to enter the control contest in a broad context.  
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This study contributes to the current literature on corporate governance and the decision making 
process by exploring various elements in the M&A process. Basing on the firm and M&A deal 
characteristics, board characteristics and ownership structure are found to significantly contribute 
to the abnormal returns. However, we find no significant effect of financial strength, and 
ownership structure on the likelihood of a white knight takeover attempt. Instead, our empirical 
results provide evidence that firm size, Tobin’s q as well as the directors’ age and tenure is what 
contributes most to the white knight decision and additionally, we find that striving for the 
market power in its industry is an important motivation for a white knight takeover attempt.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the findings on market returns and 
motivations for the acquirers or bidders as well as literature that offer direct insights into the 
white knights. Section 3 describes the data, the sample selection and the related variables 
definitions. In Section 4, we introduce the methods that we use to examine firm performance and 
describe our models. The empirical results are reported and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 
provides concluding remarks and discusses possible extensions of our study. Finally, section 7 
addresses the limitations and offers direction for further research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Research on returns for the bidders 
 
On the one hand, a few prior studies suggest that acquirers realize positive returns (Jensen 
&Ruback, 1983; Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992), or at least don’t 
perform poorly than their targets (Franks, Harris &Titman 1991). Hansen and Lott (1996) make 
it further by examining the returns to bidders acquiring private and public targets and found out 
that the bidders experience a higher return when purchasing a private firm. 
On the other hand, other studies suggest that the intended benefits of acquisitions are often not 
realized and shareholders of the acquirers often face experience negative average returns (Roll, 




Meanwhile, there are also research compares the market returns on multiple bidders. Schipper 
and Thompson (1983) examine bidder returns for 55 firms from 1952 to 1968 and found positive 
abnormal returns of 13 percent in the 12 months up to and including the announcement of the 
acquisition program but found no significant stock price change to subsequent acquisition 
announcements. Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins (1983) show that most bidding firms make multiple 
bids throughout the 17- year sample period of their study and bidding firms gain significantly 
during the twenty-one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) study shareholder returns for firs that acquired five or 
more firms within a short time period and found out that bidder shareholders gain when buying a 
private firm or subsidiary but lose when purchasing a public firm. And bidders’ return is greater 
the larger the target and in stock deal. 
2.2 Evidence on motivation for bidders 
 
The results that bids are often made over the market price raise an important question: if bidder 
returns are not positive, then why do firms make acquisitions? Previous research tried to explore 
the motive, other than value maximization, behind the mergers: 
First view is debt-and –taxes hypothesis. Asquith and Mullins (1983) analyze the effect of 
personal taxes on the allocation decisions of the firm and show that dividends and stock 
repurchases are tax-inefficient uses of financial slack, while internal investment and acquisitions 
create value by “sheltering income from personal taxation”. Majd and Myers (1987) argue that 
conglomerate firms pay less in taxes than their segments would pay separately due to the tax 
code’s asymmetric treatment of gains and losses and "'slack-rich" bidder pair with "slack-poor" 
targets to create value. Bruner (1998) shows evidence to support the hypothesis that capital 
structure change provides bidders and targets a motive for merger. More related financial motive 
theory contends that there is a gain to shareholders in mergers from the use of excess cash or 
unused debt capacity, but none of the theories specifies whether the financial slack is in the 
bidding firm, the target, or both. 
Second view is related with agency theory or inefficient management that managers of bidding 
firms pursue personal objectives. Marris (1963) argues that managers try to maximize the growth 
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rate of their firm but they are constrained from totally ignoring shareholder interests due to the 
threat of takeover and the possibility of termination of their employment. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) examine the acquisition process from the managerial perspective and they contend that 
“pressure brought by hostile takeovers effectively restricted non- value-maximizing conduct by 
manager” and targets of hostile bids need for external discipline. Amihud, Lev & Travlos (1990) 
show that negative returns of bidders are caused by low managerial ownership of bidders’ stock. 
Their findings are strengthened by by Morck, Shleifer and Vishy (1990) who contend that 
managers of bidding firms consider both their personal benefits from the investment and the 
consequences for the market value of the firm. Thus, according to them, bad acquisitions are a 
manifestation of agency problems in the firm. 
Synergy hypothesis has also been postulated as one of the motives of mergers. According to this 
hypothesis, the purpose of the mergers is benefit from synergy resulting from economies of 
scale, improved production techniques, complementary resources, increased market power, and 
other value-creating mechanisms.  Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) present evidence that the 
permanent positive revaluation of the unsuccessful target shares is largely due to “the 
anticipation of another bid that would ultimately result in the transfer of control of the target 
resources” and concluded that the synergy hypothesis is a better explanation for the nature of 
tender offers.  Hubbard and Pahlia (1999) examine the 1960s conglomerate wave and find strong 
support for the synergy hypothesis but no evidence consistent with the debt-and-taxes 
hypothesis. In addition, they report that acquiring firms that make multiple bids do not 
experience higher level of free cash flows. Montgomery (1994) discusses the motivation of 
firms’ diversification by comparing the market-power view, resource view and agency view and 
concluded that acquisitions often do not lead to increases in corporate wealth forbidding firms.  
Hubris hypothesis is put forward by Roll (1986), who analyzes the steps in a takeover and argues 
that hubris on the part of individual decision makers should be one of the possible reasons to 
explain the takeover phenomenon. It is later complemented by Malmendier and Tate (2008) who 
analyze the impact of CEO overconfidence on merger decisions by using the decisions of CEOs 
in large companies to measure biased managerial beliefs and using the press to measure 
outsiders’ perceptions of the CEOs, from which they illustrate how overconfidence of CEO 
affect their overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers.  
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To provide a rationale for high-premium initial bids , Fishman (1988) builds a two-bidder model 
to study the takeover bidding process within the context of asymmetric as well as costly 
information and demonstrated that a bidder could make a high-premium initial offer to deter a 
second bidder from competing, in which the information conveyed by the bid pre-empts a second 
bidder. In this information-based background, he noticed that there are difference between 
single- bidder contests and multiple-bidder contests and it’s important to distinguish between 
first and later bidders when studying the returns to bidders in multiple-bidder contests.  
 
2.3 Research on white knight  
 
Other studies look specifically at White Knights, which is defined as a subsequent and friendly 
bid following a hostile bid in a corporate control contest. Jennings & Mazzeo (1993) and 
Schwert (2000) show that after uninvited hostile takeover bids, in order to improve the terms of 
this initial offer, target firms are inclined to try to attract a friendly competing bid by a “white 
knight”. This maximizes the value of the target company’s shares at the cost of the acquirer. 
Banerjee and Owers (1992) and Niden (1993), find that white-knight bidders experience 
significant negative abnormal returns while hostile bidders have significant positive abnormal 
returns, which supports the findings of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). They find out that 
subsequent bidders, including White Knights, experience significant, negative abnormal returns. 
By contrast, Smiley and Stewart (1985) compare the return of successful White Knight and 
unsuccessful White Knight and find that the successful White Knights appear to experience 
significant positive excess return whereas the unsuccessful White Knights experience significant 
negative abnormal returns. 
In addition to the ones that look at the impact of the White Knight's bid on common stock returns 
and the reaction of the market, there are other studies that focus on management of White 
Knight. Banerjee and Owers (1993) showed that White Knights' compensation packages have a 
lower percentage of options and stock appreciation rights than do those of hostile bidders, which 
implies that White-knight management might not be strongly motivated to act in the 
shareholders' interest. Carroll, Griffith and Rudolph (1999) found out that it is a part of pattern 
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that White Knight managers make less efficient decisions than do hostile bidders and their 
acquisition of the target is yet another negative NPV investment. Meanwhile, they also showed 
that shareholders of these firms do not replace inefficient managers.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) postulate the maximum synergy hypothesis which looks at the 
combined target and bidding firms’ shareholders wealth. According to their model, the combined 
wealth of target and bidding firms’ shareholders is expected to be greater in white knight 
acquisitions than in non-white knight acquisitions because of the optimal synergistic 
combination of target and bidding firm assets. Recently, Eichler and Maltritz (2010) presented an 
options-based approach to determine the unobservable takeover price that market expects for a 
new prospective offer to estimate the probability by calculating the probability that a higher offer 
will be placed in the future. They argue that the expected takeover price can reveal the 
appropriate amount for the next bid and, thus, avoid overpricing. 
3. Data  
 
3.1 Data sources and sample description  
 
To be classified as a white knight, the bidder must meet the following three criteria:  (1) It is a 
subsequent bid; (2) It is a friendly bid; (3) It follows a hostile bid. Our sample of M&A 
transactions comes from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. Hostility is usually perceived when an offer is made public that is aggressively rejected 
by the target firm. Since perception of hostility are closely linked with takeover negotiations that 
are far from completion, several definitions of hostility exist. (Schwert, 2000). The SDC 
definition for the hostile bidders includes that the bidder initiates the takeover and the target 
board is initially unprepared or not willing to enter into merger negotiations. 
Considering the data availability of other related data bases, we select all mergers and 
acquisitions announced between January 1992 and December 2012 where both acquirer and 
target firms are listed as public firms in primary stock exchange, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Initially, we obtain 5531 
deals. Then, we filter the M&A transactions by fixing the target and thus gain 345 groups of 
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multiple bids. Then, according to the attitude of the deal, we sorted out the M&A deal where the 
first bidder is friendly and the most subsequent bidder after the first bidder is hostile,  thus 
leading to a sample of 49 groups. By restricting the M&A transaction to a two year period and 
the target having two bidders, we get our final sample of two M&A groups. The first group is the 
pair of 41 target firms and 41 hostile bidders while the second group is consist of the target firms 
and its 41 friendly bidding firms, namely the white knight. Additionally, from SDC, we also 
identify the deal characteristics such as the method of payment (cash versus stock) and the 
transaction value.  
To get the daily stock return data, we merge the M&A sample with the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) data and Compustat for annual financial statement information. Then, we 
turn to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that mandated all registrants to file their 
documents online using the EDGAR system starting from 1996,which is also one of the reasons 
for us to choose our M&A transactions sample period. The EDGAR database has over 600 
different types of forms, and for the purpose of our study, we gather all available proxy 
statements (Form DEF 14-A), which provide detailed information for each director, ownership 
structure and executives information. We also supplement our director data using the Risk-
Metrics Directors database. In short, we make sure that we can either have access to proxy 
statements from EDGAR for the acquirer and the target or available director information from 
Risk-Metrics in the year prior to the deal announcement.  
Table 1 describes sample frequencies for all the bidders, including both white knight and hostile 
bidders, for their common target firms. In our sample, M&A are most frequently in year 1994, 
year 1995 and year 1998. Table 2 reports sample frequencies of industries for the white knight. 
In our sample, white knights are most frequently in year 1995 and year 1998. Table 3 reports 
sample frequencies of industries for the white knights in these M&A contests with the criteria of 
the Fama French 49 industry classification. The sample consists of 41 white knights who make 
the announcement between January 1992 and December 2012. In our sample, the white knight 
appears most frequently in banking, business services and medical equipment industry. Table 4 
reports the summary statistics for the white knights and their targets. We describe the variables 
construction in more detail in Appendix A. The first panel presents the white knight firm 
characteristics and the second panel are the firm’s characteristics for the hostile bidders. The 
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mean values of the white knights firm size, Tobin’s q, ROA and FCF are very close to the hostile 
bidders, which suggests a very similar firm characteristics for white knights and hostile bidders.   
Table 5 provides Pearson correlation coefficients correlations between our variables. Stock deal 
is positively correlated with deal value and leverage while it’s negatively related with director 
age, director tenure, D&E ownership, ROA and FCF. But, all the absolute value of correlation 
efficient is less than 0.5. 
Firm size is positively correlated with deal value, board size and directors, ROA and FCF. 
Directors’ average age is positively related with director’s average tenure while it’s negatively 
related with D&E ownership and Tobin’s q, D&E ownership is positively related with 
Blockhoders’ ownership and negatively related with the percentage of Outside-director. Other 
variables are not highly correlated. In ours study, multicollinearity among control variables is not 
significant since no values had any correlations greater than 0.6. 
3.2 Variable definitions 
 
3.21 firm and deal characteristics  
 
The bidder metrics that we control for are firm size, Tobin's q, leverage, ROA, and free cash 
flow (FCF), all of which are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Pre-announcement stock price run-up is measured over the 200-day window 
from event day -210 to event day -11. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find strong evidence that bidder size is negatively 
related with the acquirer's announcement period CAR. But they haven’t investigated how the 
size effect relates to managerial incentives and firm governance. In our test, we include firm size, 
which is the log transformation of the acquirer's total assets, as an important control variable to 
explore the effect on the Cumulative abnormal return. Additionally, in our logit model to 
investigate the motivation of the white knight, we also introduce the relative firm size, which is 
calculated as the target firm size scaled by the firm size of the white knight. 
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Tobin’s q, according to previous studies, has an ambiguous effect on CAR. Lang, Stulz, and 
Walking (1991) and Servaes (1991) show a positive relation for tender offer acquisitions and 
public firm acquisitions while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a negative relation 
in a comprehensive sample of acquisitions. We define Tobin's q as the ratio of a bidder's market 
value of assets over its book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the 
book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common 
equity. 
Based on Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, we also control for the acquirer's financial 
leverage, ROA and FCF. Leverage is an important governance mechanism because higher debt 
levels help reduce future free cash flows and limit managerial discretion (Stulz, 1990). Ghosh 
and Jain (2000) find that financial leverage of combined firms increases significantly following 
mergers by showing that the change in financial leverage around mergers is significantly 
positively correlated with the announcement period market-adjusted returns. Also, Garvey and 
Hanka (1999) provide evidence that leverage is related to a firm's takeover protection. Lang, 
Stulz and Walking (1991) further test Jensen’s free cash flow theory by using Tobin’s q to 
identify firms beset by agency problems and expected to invest free cash flow in negative NPV 
projects. Basing on all these former research, we include leverage, which is calculated as book 
value of debt scaled by book value of assets and FCF, which is equal to operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expense minus income taxes minus capital expenditures scaled by 
book value of total assets in our test.  Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as the operating 
income before depreciation, scaled by book value of assets.  
The deal characteristics that we control for include method of payment and relative deal size. 
Previous research show that payment of method in M&A transaction has a great impact to the 
CARs.  On the one hand, when it comes to common stock, Hansen's (1987) model includes it 
due to its "contingency pricing effect." Stock financing forces target shareholders to share the 
risk that the acquirer may have overpaid. Also, Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
(2002) report that the stock price impact of stock-financed deals is less negative or even positive 
when the target is privately held. On the other hand, Cash not only signals a high value for the 
target, but also preempts other firms from bidding (Fishman, 1989). We create a dummy denoted 
by stock deal, where stock deal equals one for acquisitions financed either partially or fully with 
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stock and zero otherwise; According to Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), bidder announcement returns increase in relative deal size. In 
our test, we also include relatively deal size, which is constructed with deal value divided by 
acquirers’ market value of equity.  
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 10 and 90 
percentiles before the regression. 
3.22 Corporate governance and board characteristics  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms have a significant effect on the quality of a firm’s 
acquisitions. Acquirers with a higher value of the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003) obtain significantly lower abnormal returns around acquisition announcement date 
(Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). 
The board of directors is viewed as an important internal corporate governance mechanism. 
Yermack (1996) suggest that smaller boards are more effective. Similarly, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) and Weisbach (1988) and suggest that firms with greater portion of independent directors 
perform better. However, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find that both small and large boards 
can be favorable, which actually involves firm characteristics. They show that firm value 
increases with board size for complex, large, and diversified firms and with the percentage of 
inside directors for R&D intensive firms. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find out that optimal 
board size and structure is determined as a trade-off between the costs and benefits of monitoring 
and advising. They show that R&D intensive firms with significant growth opportunities have 
smaller and less independent boards while larger firms are more likely to have larger and more 
independent boards. In our test, considering the potential link between the firm size and the 
board size, we create two dummies, firms’ size and board’ size. The firms with the board size 
greater than median take value one and board size less than the median take value 1.  
All studies show that poor firm performance increases the likelihood of a change in the top 
management team. However, Weisbach (1988) documents that this result is present only for 
firms that have a board dominated by outside directors, and attributes this to successful 
monitoring by outside directors. The effects of outsider directors are, nevertheless, ambiguous. 
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Some research argue that reputational concerns and fear of lawsuits can motivate outside 
directors to represent shareholders’ interest (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 
1987) while others assert that outside directors are more likely to be aligned with top 
management than shareholders as top management has great influence over who sits on the board 
and generally, non-management directors only hold a tiny portion of the stock of the firm (Jensen 
1993; Patton and Baker, 1987). A direct paper related with our research is that Brickley, Coles 
and Terry ( 1994), who find out that  significant, positive relation between the stock-market 
reaction to the adoption of poison pills and the fraction of outside directors on the board. Here, 
we observe the percentage of outside directors and we try to explore the possible rationale that 
can explain firms’ corporate control behaviors and market reactions.   
Similarly, extended tenure enhances organizational commitment and willingness to expend effort 
toward company goals (Buchanan, 1974). Vafeas (2003) finds out that increases in board tenure 
are associated with greater committee participation and more board directorships early on, and 
with declining committee participation and fewer directorships thereafter. We also include 
directors’ average age and average tenure in our test.  
As active investors provide benefits with their incentive to undertake costly monitoring (Jensen, 
1991), blockholders or institutional shareholders are considered to be potentially active investors. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrate how the presence of a blockholder unaffiliated with 
management contributes to relieving the free-rider problem. According to them, “large 
shareholders can facilitate third-party takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares 
with the bidder”, which implies that the probability of a takeover attempt is related to ownership 
by pre-existing blockholders. Black (1992) argues that institutional shareholders can take actions 
that more properly align managers’ interests. In our test, we measure the intuitional investors 
influence by the percentage ownership of institutional shareholders, which is at least 5 percent 
prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
As a matter of fact, ownership structure, executive compensation structure, and board 
composition are determined by each other (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) Loderer and Rosenfeld 
(1985) find that managerial welfare affects merger decisions and substantial amounts of own-
company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management. In our test, 
the number of executive and directors as a group as well as their ownership are examined.  
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The potential agency and information costs associated with separate titles are important 
determinants of leadership structure. By separating the chairman-CEO positions, it will reduce 
agency costs and improve firm performance. (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Brickley, Coles & Jarrell 
1997) So, whether the chairman also serves as the CEO of the firm is one of important variables 
to measure how the leadership structure may affect the investment and corporate control policy 
of a firm. We set the dummy Chairman-CEO to be equal to one if the chairman serves as the 
CEO of the firm and zero otherwise.  
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Short term impact 
 
To measure the effect of an acquisition on the value of an acquirer and a target, we obtain 
cumulative abnormal using the standard event study method. The model we use to predict 
expected returns is the market model:  
 
 
Where  is the continuously compounded rate of return for firm i on day t,   is the 
continuously compounded rate of return for CRSP value-weighted market index on day t and  
is the market model prediction error term. For each firm i, the abnormal return is calculated as 
the difference between the actual return and the expected return on day t: 
 
 
Since some of the abnormal returns behavior show up in the pre-event period and post-event 
returns provides information on market efficiency (Kothari and Warner, 2006), we are very 
interested in the time series effect of abnormal return. We sum daily prediction errors for each 
firm in the window. The following equation indicates the CAR for firm i from event day  to the 




 We also calculate the average CARs across firms to obtain average CAR for the window in each 
group with the equation below. 
                                                                            
Where n is the number of the firms in each of the group.  
 
4.2 Long term impact  
 
To examine the long-term abnormal stock performance, we use the buy-and hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs), which are defined as the differences between the long-run returns of sample 
firms and those of benchmark firms selected to capture expected return. Actually, the CAR is a 
biased predictor of BHAR due to differences in compounding. BHAR measures well the long-
run investor experience, and they can capture the investor’s experience from buying and holding 
securities for 3 to 5 years (Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
Specifically, we calculate BHAR using equally weighted market return, value weighted market 
return, and return of matching sample as the benchmark return, respectively. The BHAR for firm 
i from time period to time period b is calculated as follows: 
 
  
Where  refers to the monthly return of firm I on month t, and is the return on bench 
mark in month t. We examine return during the event month and for a one year period 
afterwards. The average buy- and-hold abnormal return is calculated as the equally weighted 




Where n is the number of sample firms.  
4.3 Multivariate regression model 
In order to examine how the finance situation, management and board structure affect the white 
knight returns, we use a multivariate regression model by controlling for factors which have been 
shown to affect announcement returns by earlier work in the M&A literature. The full models is 
specified as follows: 
 
 
4.4 Logit model  
 
Trying to explore to what extent the firm characteristic, management and board structure makes 
affects a firm’s corporate control policy, we use the logit model.  
                                                         =  
 
 
: There is a relation between the variables and the probability of a firm turning into a white 








5.  Empirical Results 
 
Section 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. 5.2 discusses the univariate 
analysis and multivariate analysis of white knight acquisition likelihood and the interpretation of 
these, which provides evidence through short term window and long term window. Also, several 
specification checks are conducted to control for other factors that could be important in 
determining white knights.  
5.1 Univariate CAR comparisons 
 
Table 6 presents the mean and median white knights announcement returns (WK_CAR), target 
announcement returns (T_CAR), and the combined portfolio announcement returns of hostile 
bidders and the targets (PCAR1) as well as combined portfolio announcement returns of white 
knights and the targets (PCAR2) over each event window around the deal announcement date for 
two groups of bidding with 164 samples (targets and acquirers both included) between 1992 and 
2012.  
Panel A shows the mean and median CARs over the three day [-1, +1] event window around the 
deal announcement date. We find that, for the acquirers including both the white knight and the 
hostile bidder, the mean three-day abnormal return is negative and significant from 1% level. 
Specifically, the mean CARs for white knights is -1.88% and the mean CARs for the hostile 
bidder is -1.42%. This is in line with the former studies that acquires usually experience negative 
abnormal return and M&A transactions usually destroy value for acquirer shareholders when 
they involve acquisitions of public firms (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie, 2007; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  
The targets, by contrast, experience a significantly high positive announcement return. 
Specifically, the target gains a mean three day abnormal return of 26.69% when it receives the 
first bid from the hostile bidders and the target has a mean abnormal returns of 19.3% when the 
white knight make the bid. This confirms to the former studies that wealth transfer to the targets.   
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The mean three-day combined portfolio announcement return of white knight and target is 
denoted by PCAR1, which is 8.83% and the combine abnormal return of hostile bidder and 
target is denoted by PCAR2, which equals to 11.79%. This is consistent with the positive 
combined returns shown by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004), and Wang and Xie (2009). In addition, for the period close to the announcement 
date, the results are also robust if we use the alternative three day [-2, -2], [-3, -3] window around 
the announcement date.  Also, median CARs show a similar pattern as the means. 
Panel B shows the mean and median CARs over the 61 days [-30, 30] event window around the 
deal announcement date. Again, in this event window, the targets show very significantly 
positive abnormal return, with mean CARs of 33.59% around the hostile bid announcement and 
with a mean CARs of 12.52% around the white knight bid announcement. Besides, the positive 
CARs remain significant for the combined portfolio of white knight and target and that of hostile 
and bidders, reaching at a high mean value of 10.18% and 7.05% separately. However, we notice 
that, the mean 61-day abnormal return of white knights turns to be positive and significant at 1% 
level, with a mean cumulative abnormal return of 1.59%. 
Moreover, we also find that, for BHAR1, which denotes the short term Buy-and-hold abnormal 
return during the 200 trading days ending two months before the announcement date with CRSP 
value-weighted return as the market index , its pattern of trend is similar with the [-30, 30] 
window.  
Figures 1 to 3 capture the trends in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around bidding 
announcement date by using equally weighted market index returns. Figure 1 depicts trends of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the hostile bidders’ announcement by using equally 
weighted market index returns in the 61 days window [-30, 30]. As is shown, despite some small 
falls and downs, the hostile bidders obviously experience a fast growing tend before the M&A 
announcement date and especially, when it closes to the announcement date, the CARs of hostile 
bidders reach its peak. However, after the announcement date, they begin to drop down 
gradually.  
Figure 2 shows the market reaction with the 61 days event window [-30, 30] around the 
announcement date. The market reaction for the white knight is more complicated than hostile 
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bidders. Firstly, the CARs of white knights show an increasing trend around one month before its 
announcement date. However, around 20 days before the announcement, there is a sudden drop. 
After that turning point, they tend to recover and go up despite some small fluctuations until they 
reach the peak close to the announcement date, after which they keep declining until the arrival 
of the announcement date. Reaching a bottom at the announcement date, they generally keep this 
decreasing trend in spite of some small ups and downs in that month.  
Through Figure 3 and Figure 4, we compared the trend pattern of the two groups and we 
compare the trend pattern of the white knight and the hostile bidders in Figure 6. Figure 3 shows 
the market reaction with the 61 days event window [-30, 30] around the announcement date of 
the targets when they were bid by the white knights. The targets have a rise-up trend when it 
closes to the announcement date and then at around the announcement, they experience a sharp 
increase. Moreover, they still keep a steady trend for a certain period after the announcement 
date. Figure 4 depicts the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the targets and the hostile 
bidders in the short term (thirty days before through thirty days after the bidding announcement 
date) using equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark. Series 1 depicts the trend of 
CARs for the hostile bidders 30 days before and after the announcement date while series 2 
represents the CARs for the targets. Their pattern is generally similar except the fact that the 
target experience more high CARs when they receive the hostile bid. Additionally, the white 
knight shares some common acquirer traits in bidding contests and they experience trends similar 
with hostile bidders.  
5.2 White Knight 
5.21. Univrariate Analysis  
 
As discussed in the part of univariate CARs comparisons, we find that market reaction process 
for white knight differs before and after the announcement date. To observe this difference 
further, we break down the (-30, 30) days window into three windows (-30,-2), (-2,-2) and (2, 
30). From table 7, it is observed that actually, the stock returns experience a positive increase 
until two days before the announcement date suggesting that with some release of information of 
being a bidder, the market reacts positively in advance. However, the market reacts negatively 
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towards the white knight around two days of the bidding announcement. This negative stock 
reaction remains within a month of the bidding announcement.  
 
5.22 Multivariate analysis 
 
In this section, we tests series of factors that may contribute to the market reaction to the stock 
returns to conduct multivariate analysis of white knight acquisition likelihood by setting some 
control variables on deal characteristics. In controlling for all known determinants of bidder 
returns, it is important to note that some bidder, deal or governance characteristics could be 
endogenously determined. The presence of such variables in the regressions could potentially 
bias the coefficient estimates of our governance indices. Therefore, we first estimate a set of 
separate regressions by using three models. In table 8, Model (1) and model (2) is conducted to 
test the firm characteristics, board characteristics and ownership structure separately while 
Model (3) is the full model. In addition, we also check this with long term observations by 
setting the dependent variable as lagged two-year and three-year BHARs, which are reported 
from table 9 and table 10.  
A. Abnormal returns, firm characteristics and deal characteristics.  
 
Firstly, we  are interested to see how the firm finance situation influences acquirer returns in a 
multivariate setting by controlling for factors which have been shown to affect announcement 
returns by earlier work in the M&A literature. Specifically, we include deal characteristics such 
as stock deal and deal value. We focus on the short term analysis, as is shown in table 8, where 
the dependent variable in these regressions is the three-day cumulative abnormal returns of the 
white knight (WK_CAR). The results show that the dummy stock deal is negatively but slightly 
related to abnormal stock returns at significant level of 0.01 in the full model. This finding that 
stock-financed deals have lower CARs is consistent with Travlos (1987), Harris and Raviv 
(1988), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) and Martin (1996). According to these previous 
researches, corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or 
debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing 
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control. Besides, our regression results suggest the variable deal value is not significantly related 
to abnormal stock returns. 
For other control variables on firm characteristics, both the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the parameter estimates are relatively stable across the three model specifications shown in 
Table 8.  Above all, the variable firm size is positively related with CARs of white knights. This 
is inconsistent with the general research on acquirers that bidder size has a significantly negative 
effect on bidder returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), suggesting that white knights, 
as a special type of acquirer, with larger firm size generally pay less premiums and invite more 
markets positive reactions than those with small.  
Secondly, we find that Tobin’s q is insignificant to the cumulative abnormal returns. In fact, 
prior studies find that an acquirer's Tobin's q has an ambiguous effect on CAR. Ghosh & Jain 
(2000) and Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz (2004) find that Tobin’s q is negatively related to 
the cumulative abnormal returns while Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) and Servaes (1991) 
document a positive relation for tender offer acquisitions and public firm acquisitions, 
respectively. To measure firm’s performance, we also use return on assets ROA. Under model 
(1), the impact of ROA is not quite significant but we can observe its strong positive relation 
with the CARs with a high t value of 3.32 at a significant level 0.001 under the advanced model 
(3).  
Based on Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, we also control for the acquirer's financial 
leverage and free cash flow (FCF). As shown in table 8, the financial leverage is positively 
related to the cumulative abnormal returns at a significance level of 0.1 in the full model (3). 
This is consistent with the result of Ghosh and Jain (2000) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), 
who also provide evidence that the change in financial leverage around mergers is significantly 
positively correlated with the announcement period market-adjusted returns. 
Free cash flow (FCF) is negatively related to the CARs with a significant level of 0.001 in both 
the model (1) and model (3). This result confirms to the free cash flow hypothesis advanced by 
Jensen (1988), who states that managers endowed with free cash flow will invest it in negative 
net present value (NPV) projects rather than pay it out to shareholders. This is also consistent 
with the results of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), who also report supportive evidence to the 
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free cash flow hypothesis and argues that the effect of free cash flow on bidder returns explains a 
larger fraction of the cross-sectional variation in returns than the nature of the control contest. 
Considering that higher free cash flow means better recent firm performance, we assume that this 
could be correlated with higher quality managers, who tend to make better acquisition decisions. 
With these assumptions, in the following sections, we further take the managerial quality, 
corporate governance and board characteristics into consideration to test how these traits drive 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the white knights.  
B.  Abnormal returns, board characteristics and ownership structure 
 
Above all, board size is an important factor to examine the board structure. With the absence of 
firm size, board size is insignificant to the cumulative abnormal returns. However, after we 
introduce other firm characteristics like firm size into our regression, we observe that board size 
affects negatively to the CARs at a significance level of 0.05. This makes sense since better 
board structure can be related to the need of firm size and if the board size is over large, this will 
easily lead to inefficiency. That may suggest that, when the board is ineffective in performing its 
functions, agency costs and consequently the takeover cost for a bidder are high. Secondly, 
tenure is negatively related to the CARs at a significance level of 0.05 in the model (2) and 
tenure becomes more significant reaching at a 0.01 level in model (3). Moreover, we find that 
directors’ age is not significantly related to the CARs. Finally, the dummy to measure whether a 
chairman also serves the CEO in a firm is found to be insignificant to the CARs. In view of the 
short term window [-1, 1], the percentage of outsider directors are not significantly related to the 
CARs. However, we notice that this variable turns to be very significant at 0.001 level in the 
long run according to the regression analysis of lagged one-year BHARs, two-year BHARs and 
three-year BHARs, suggesting that outside directors do have an impact on the market’s reaction.  
Besides, we examine the ownership held by directors and executives as a group (D&E 
Ownership). In the short window, we find that it’s positively related to the CARs at a 
significance level of 0.01 in model (2) and at a significance level of 0.001 in the full model.  We 
also notice that the ownership held by blockholders is negatively related to the CARs for both the 
short long window and long term window. In the full model, it reaches a high t value of -3.97 
with significance level of 0.001.  
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C. Controlling for other factors 
 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that acquirers with greater stock price run-up prior to the 
acquisition announcement have lower CARs and argued that acquisitions might be motivated to 
a greater extent by the overvalued stock of the acquirer. We also checked BHAR during the 200 
trading days ending two months before the announcement date with CRSP value-weighted return 
as the market index in our tests but find out that this independent variable is insignificant to the 
CARs in all models.  Another factor that may affect the CARs is geographic proximity between 
the acquirer and the target, which is put forwarded by Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Uysal (2008), 
who find that acquirer announcement returns in local transactions are higher than those in non-
local transactions. However, this local deal variable enters negatively but not significant at all in 
our test.  
 
D. Testing the probability with the Logit model  
 
As discussed, we are very interested to know what drives the white knights into this bidding 
contest. We  use a logit model to estimate the impact of board characteristics and ownership 
structure basing on the firm’s and deal characteristics on white knights likelihood. Table 11 
report the results from logit regression where the dependent variable is set to be one if the firm is 
a white knight and is set to be zero if the firm is a hostile or unsolicited bids.  The coefficient on 
ownership held by directors and executives as a group, Block-holders’ ownership and outside 
directors’ ownerships are not significant. Among all the variables related with firm 
characteristics, we find that firm size and leverage are positively related to the likelihood of 
being a white knight at a significance of 0.05 level. According to Roll’s hubris hypothesis, a 
possible interpretation for the variable firm size is that a firm with a larger size and meanwhile a 
good performance is more motivated for new investment opportunity like the corporate control. 
More specifically in this bidding contest, with the former bidder, the hostile, making a strong 
offer, a white knight has to be large enough to make a bid competitive to the hostile bidder. The 
significantly positive relation between leverage and the probability of being a white is consistent 
with the result of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), suggesting that leverage does have some 
power in motivating managers from making bad acquisitions. In this case, it indicates that 
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leverage provides incentives for managers to improve firm performance through corporate 
control as they are threatened by the possibility to lose their jobs if their firms fall into financial 
distress. Finally, among all the corporate governance, management and ownership structure 
variables, we observe that director’s tenure and directors age is positively related with the 
likelihood of being a white knight, suggesting that directors play an important role in deciding 
whether a firm is willing to become a white knight. Especially, we add the dummy Industry, 
which equals 1 under the case that the target and white knight belongs to the same industry or 
that the target and hostile belongs to the same industry, zero otherwise. As shown in the model 
(2) of table 11, we find that this Industry variable contributes to the probability of being a white 
knight at a significance level of 0.01, suggesting that to keep up the market power could be used 
as a market strategy by the white knight decision makers. To further explore the rationality of the 
white knight attempt, as shown in table 12, we examined the successful white knight and the 
unsuccessful white knight. However, the control variables are not significant to explain the 
probability of being a successful white knight. 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on a special participant in the bidding contest, the white knight. We carry out 
an empirical examination to observe the abnormal returns of the white knights and examine 
factors that could influence the white knight attempt. Above all, it is observed that the white 
knight experiences significantly negative abnormal returns around acquisition announcements, 
which is consistent with former research on the white knight (Banerjee and Owers, 1992; Niden, 
1993; Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1988). Moreover, through the CARs break-down three windows 
around the bidding announcement, we find that the market reaction towards the white knight is 
positive while it turns to be negative after the white knight announcement.  
 
To explain what factors affect the market reaction, we introduce a series of firm characteristics, 
corporate governance, management and ownership structure variables by controlling for some 
basic deal characteristics to do the regression analysis both in the short term and in the long run. 
In terms of the short term analysis, on the one hand, we find that leverage and Return on assets 
(ROA) are positively related to CARs while free cash flow (FCF) is negatively related to the 
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M&A announcement CARs, which is consistent with the existing related former research (Ghosh 
and Jain , 2000;  Masulis, Wang, and Xie , 2007); We also find that Board size is negatively 
related to the CARs when we control other firm characteristics, which confirms to the conclusion 
of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), who show that both small and large boards can be 
favorable depending on the firm characteristics; On the other hand, our result also show that firm 
size and the ownership held by directors and executives as a group (D&E ownership) is 
positively related to the CARs while average directors’ tenure and Blockholders ownership is 
negatively related to the CARs at a high significance level. In addition, we find that outside 
directors and the case chairman also serves as the CEO has no effect on the CARs. In terms of 
the long term window, the effect of the D&E turns to be still significantly but negatively related 
to the stock returns while Blockholders’ ownership still be significantly and positively.  
 
Then, focusing on corporate acquisition decisions, we further investigate the motivation for the 
white knight attempt under the logit model. We find no significant effect of financial strength, 
and ownership structure on the likelihood of a white knight takeover attempt. Instead, we find 
that firm size, leverage as well as the directors’ age and tenure is what significantly contributes 
to the white knight decision. Importantly, we find that striving for the market power in its 
industry is an important motivation for a white knight takeover attempt. Finally, we take a closer 
look at the cases where the white knight withdraws from the bidding contest but we find that all 
the variables are powerless to explain their motivation.  
 
Meanwhile, we also examine the characteristics of the white knight acquisitions in comparison 
with the hostile bidder and the target firm. Consistent with lots of former research on the returns 
of the acquirer and the target, our results show that target experience huge spike of cumulative 
abnormal return during both the bid and the hostile bidder experience negative CARs (Bradley, 
Desai & Kim, 1988, Banerjee and Owers, 1992; Niden, 1993; Moeller, Schilingemann, Stulz, 
2005). We also test what affects the CARs for hostile but the result is not significant.  




In fact, the 1980s saw a large wave of takeover and restructuring activity and among them are 
lots of hostile bidders and white knights. Due to the missing data on corporate governance and 
management in the related database, our sample is relatively small restricting from year 1992 to 
year 2012. This will limit the scope of this study at some point. Future research could be done by 
further exploring the industry competition analysis and additionally by exploring possible social 
connections between board members, which could also be an interesting point that spurs the 
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Table 1: Description of M&A years for the full sample.  
The sample consists of 82 bidders firms including 42 white knights and 42 hostile targets and 42 
targets in the M&A occurred between January 1992 and December 2012. 
Year  bidder Firms % of sample  
1992 3 3.61% 
1993 1 1.20% 
1994 11 13.25% 
1995 17 20.48% 
1996 9 10.84% 
1997 8 9.64% 
1998 10 12.05% 
1999 4 4.82% 
2000 5 6.02% 
2001 1 1.20% 
2002 0 0.00% 
2003 0 0.00% 
2004 2 2.41% 
2005 2 2.41% 
2006 3 3.61% 
2007 0 0.00% 
2008 1 1.20% 
2009 1 1.20% 
2010 2 2.41% 
2011 1 1.20% 





Table 2: Description of M&A years for the white knight. 
This table report sample frequency for the white knights, which range from January 1992 to 
December 2012. 
Year  white knight percentage of sample  
1992 1 2.44% 
1994 3 7.32% 
1995 8 19.51% 
1996 3 7.32% 
1997 4 9.76% 
1998 8 19.51% 
1999 2 4.88% 
2000 3 7.32% 
2001 1 2.44% 
2004 1 2.44% 
2005 1 2.44% 
2006 2 4.88% 
2008 1 2.44% 
2010 1 2.44% 
2011 1 2.44% 










Table 3: Description of corporate control industries 
This table reports sample frequencies of industries for the white knights in these M&A contests. 
The sample consists of 42 white knights who make the announcement between January 1992 and 







Aircraft 1 2.44% 
Banking 7 17.07% 
Business Services 4 9.76% 
Healthcare 2 4.88% 
Insurance 1 2.44% 
Machinery 2 4.88% 
Measuring and Control 
Equip 4 9.76% 
Medical Equipment 4 9.76% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 2 4.88% 
Pharmaceutical Products 3 7.32% 
Precious Metals 1 2.44% 
Printing and Publishing 1 2.44% 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 2 4.88% 
Retail 1 2.44% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 1 2.44% 
Telecommunications 2 4.88% 
Trading 1 2.44% 
Utilities 1 2.44% 





Table 4: Summary statistics of firm characteristics 
This table reports statistics for a sample of 41 white knights bidding firms and a sample of 41 
hostile bidding firms that come before the white knights, each with the same target between 
January 1992 and December 2012. They are public firms with complete CRSP and Compustat 
information, and have proxy statements on EDGAR or have available director data in the 
RiskMetrics database in the year prior to the deal announcement. 





     Firm Size 4.90 7.64 7.70 10.29 1.79 
Tobins' q 1.02 1.79 1.43 3.23 0.84 
Leverage 0.08 0.25 0.24 0.46 0.14 
ROA 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.07 
FCF -0.33 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.10 
      Hostile characteristics 
     Firm Size 4.46 6.61 6.44 9.00 1.46 
Tobins' q 1.02 1.59 1.48 2.42 0.51 
Leverage 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.16 
ROA 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.06 




Table 5: Correlations between independent variables 
This table reports correlations between the independent variables. The variables include Buy-and-hold return during the 200 trading 
days ending two months before the announcement date with CRSP (BHAR1), Deal value, a dummy variable that equal to one if the 
M&A deal financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm size), market value of assets over 
book value of assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over market value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), Free cash 
flow (FCF), a dummy equals 1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is bigger than the median value of other firms’ board 
directors( Board size), directors’ average age (Director age), directors average tenure (Director tenure), the percentage of common 
stock ownership held by directors and executives as a group (D&E ownership), the percentage of common stock ownership of those 
who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities (Blockholders), the percentage of outside 
directors (Outside-director), and the dummy variable that equals to one if the chairman also serves as the CEO in a firm (Chairman-
CEO) .   
















Firm size Tobins'q Leverage ROA FCF 
Deal value 1               
Stock deal  0.33214** 1              
BHAR1 0.185 0.133 1             
Board size 0.058 -0.029 -0.077 1            
Director age -0.107 -0.299** -0.324* 0.368** 1           
Director tenure -0.169 -0.459** -0.283* 0.307** 0.562** 1          
D&E 
ownership 
-0.348** -0.442*** 0.082 -0.388** -0.332** 0.217 1         
Blockhoders 0.014 -0.101 0.017 -0.477*** -0.438** -0.038 0.614** 1        
Chairman_CEO 0.252 0.256 0.092 0.106 0.035 -0.065 0.098 -0.037 1       
Outside-
director 
0.203 0.250 -0.364* 0.337** 0.443*** -0.040 -0.601** -0.423*** -0.156 1      
Firm size 0.345** -0.217 0.158** 0.448 0.181 0.266* -0.036 0.039 -0.134 -0.039 1     
Tobins'q -0.134 -0.120 0.303** -0.317* -0.287** -0.282* 0.190 0.234 -0.113 -0.280* 0.198 1    
Leverage 0.356** 0.415** -0.026 0.207 -0.192 -0.118 -0.192 0.062 0.193 0.296** 0.148 -0.532* 1   
ROA -0.160 -0.384*** -0.154 -0.105 0.184 0.357** 0.195 0.145 -0.319** -0.253 0.408** 0.369** -0.186 1  
FCF 0.087 -0.402** -0.102 0.249* 0.130 0.406** 0.207 0.156 -0.244* -0.278 0.260** 0.076 -0.297** 0.348** 1 
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Table 6: Univariate CAR comparisons.  
This table presents the mean and median white knights announcement returns (WK_CAR), target 
announcement returns (T_CAR), and combined portfolio announcement returns of the hostile 
bidders and the targets (PCAR1) as well as combined portfolio announcement returns of white 
knights and the targets (PCAR2) over each event window around the deal announcement date for 
two groups of bidding with 164 samples (targets and acquirers both included) between 1992 and 
2012. 
  (1)   (2)       
 
H_CAR                                     T_CAR1
 
WK_CAR                                         T_CAR2                      
 
PCAR1 PCAR2
Panel A: [-1,1]  










         Panel B: [-30,30]  



















Table 7: Univariate CAR and BHAR1 comparisons. 
 This table presents the mean and median white knights announcement returns in different time 
windows. BHAR1 refers to Buy-and-hold return during the 200 trading days ending two months 
before the announcement date with CRSP value-weighted returns as the market index.  
 
Panel A: CAR     
Event window (day) Mean  Median 
 [-30,30]  1.59% 1.78% 
 [-30,-2]  3.04% 2.87% 
 [-2,  2]  -1.35% -1.03% 
 [2, 30]  -2.81% -2.70% 
   Panel B: BHAR 















Table 8: Regression of CARs for white knight on explanatory variables  
This table reports the results of three regression models, in which the dependent variables are the 
equally weighted market index-adjusted abnormal return for white knights in window day [-1, 1]. 
The independent variables include Deal value, a dummy variable that equal to one if the M&A 
deal financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm 
size), market value of assets over book value of assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over 
market value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy 
equals 1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is bigger than the median value of other 
firms’ board directors( Board size), directors’ average age (Director age), directors average 
tenure (Director tenure), the percentage of common stock ownership held by directors and 
executives as a group (D&E ownership), the percentage of common stock ownership of those 
who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities 
(Blockholders), the percentage of outside directors (Outside-director), and the dummy variable 
that equals to one if the chairman also serves as the CEO in a firm (Chairman-CEO) .   
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 Coefficient    T-statistic  Coefficient   T-statistic  Coefficient    T-statistic 
Intercept -0.078 -1.320   0.141 -0.280   -0.580 -1.160 










Firm size  0.007 -1.130 
 
   
0.035** -2.770 
Tobin's q 0.007 -0.460 
 
   
-0.026 -0.580 
Leverage -0.027 -0.250 
 
   
0.527* -1.780 
ROA 0.091 -0.500 
 
   
2.150*** -3.32 
FCF -0.253*** -2.840 
 
   
-1.449*** -3.580 
Board size 
























Outside director  




Chairman - CEO 









 Adjusted R^2 0.113  
 
0.024   0.678  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Regression of two-year BHARs for white knight on explanatory variables  
 
This table reports the results of three regression models on control variables for white knights, in 
which the dependent variables are the two year lagged buy-and-hold abnormal return. The 
independent variables include Deal value, a dummy variable that equal to one if the M&A deal 
financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm size), 
market value of assets over book value of assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over market 
value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy equals 
1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is bigger than the median value of other firms’ board 
directors( Board size), directors’ average age (Director age), directors average tenure (Director 
tenure), the percentage of common stock ownership held by directors and executives as a group 
(D&E ownership), the percentage of common stock ownership of those who own beneficially 
more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities (Blockholders), the 
percentage of outside directors (Outside-director), and the dummy variable that equals to one if 
the chairman also serves as the CEO in a firm (Chairman-CEO) .   
 
  (1)    (2)    (3) 
 Coefficient  T-statistic 
SSTstatistic 
 Coefficient T-statistic  Coefficient             T-statistic 
































ROA 3.911** 0.671 
    
-1.866 -0.380 
FCF -0.539 -0.800 
    
1.874 0.600 
Board size 







































 Adjusted R^2 0.154   0.612   0.601  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.
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Table 10: Regression of three-year BHARs for white knight on explanatory variables  
 
This table reports the results of three regression models, in which the dependent variables are the 
three year lagged buy-and-hold abnormal return. The independent variables include Deal value, a 
dummy variable that equal to one if the M&A deal financed fully or partially with stock( Stock 
deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm size), market value of assets over book value of 
assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over market value of total assets (Leverage), return on 
assets (ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy equals 1 if one if a firm’s total number of 
directors is bigger than the median value of other firms’ board directors( Board size), directors’ 
average age (Director age), directors average tenure (Director tenure), the percentage of common 
stock ownership held by directors and executives as a group (D&E ownership), the percentage of 
common stock ownership of those who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of 
the company's voting securities (Blockholders), the percentage of outside directors (Outside-




(1)    (2) 
 
 (3) 




















Firm size  0.017 0.310 
    
0.136 1.100 
Tobin's Q 0.030 0.210 
    
-0.348 -0.790 
Leverage 1.598* 1.720 
    
-0.595 -0.250 
ROA 3.517** 2.250 
    
4.819 0.780 
FCF -0.434 -0.580 
    
-2.445 -0.620 
Board size 
























Outside directors  














 Adjusted R^2 0.162   0.584   0.560  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.
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Table 11: Probit estimates of the dependence of white knight attempt probability 
This table presents probit estimates of the dependence of white knight attempt probability on 
control variables. The dependent value is 1 if the bidder is a white knight and the dependent 
value is zero if the bidder is a hostile. The independent variables include Deal value, a dummy 
variable that equal to one if the M&A deal financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log 
of book value of total assets (Firm size), market value of assets over book value of assets 
(Tobin’s q), book value of debts over market value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets 
(ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy equals 1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is 
bigger than the median value of other firms’ board directors( Board size), directors’ average age 
(Director age), directors average tenure (Director tenure), the percentage of common stock 
ownership held by directors and executives as a group (D&E ownership), the percentage of 
common stock ownership of those who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of 
the company's voting securities (Blockholders), the percentage of outside directors (Outside-
director), and the dummy variable that equals to one if the chairman also serves as the CEO in a 
firm (Chairman-CEO). 
   (1)    (2) 
 
Coefficient Standard errors 
 
Coefficient Standard errors 
Intercept 7.959 0.400 
 
9.171 0.341 
Deal value  0.000 0.363 
 
0.000 0.518 
Stock deal  1.129 0.177 
 
1.007 0.206 
Firm size  0.661** 0.037 
 
0.783** 0.031 
Tobin's Q 0.763 0.129 
 
0.781 0.297 
Leverage 4.538 0.212 
 
5.845* 0.117 
ROA -10.305 0.385 
 
-10.512 0.335 
FCF 4.549 0.790 
 
0.688 0.946 
Board size -0.099 0.650 
 
-0.115 0.559 
Directors age -0.296 0.074 
 
-0.263* 0.110 
Directors tenure 0.208** 0.099 
 
0.319** 0.040 
D&E ownership 0.109 0.449 
 
-7.209 0.117 
Blockholders  -0.225 0.863 
 
-1.094 0.492 
Outside directors  1.008 0.814 
 
0.104 0.980 
Industry      2.345** 1.139 




 Model Chi square 27.240 
  
27.559 
 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.
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Table 12: Probit estimates of the dependence of white knight success 
Probit estimates of the dependence of white knight attempt probability on control variables. The 
dependent variable is 1 if the white knight completes the deal and 0 if the white knight withdraw.  
The independent variables include Deal value, a dummy variable that equal to one if the M&A 
deal financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm 
size), market value of assets over book value of assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over 
market value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy 
equals 1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is bigger than the median value of other 
firms’ board directors( Board size), directors’ average age (Director age), directors average 
tenure (Director tenure), the percentage of common stock ownership held by directors and 
executives as a group (D&E ownership), the percentage of common stock ownership of those 
who own beneficially more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities 
(Blockholders), the percentage of outside directors (Outside-director), and the dummy variable 
that equals to one if the chairman also serves as the CEO in a firm (Chairman-CEO). 
 
  Probit 
coefficient 
Wald Chi-square   Probit 
coefficient 
Wald Chi-square 
Intercept 43.828 1678.100 
 
3.146 1231.600 
CAR1 27.769 474.300 
   CAR2 












Stock deal  0.878 112.700 
 
-0.930 83.264 
Board size -2.910 13.423 
 
-3.301 14.702 
Directors age 1.097 33.648 
 
2.439 22.806 
Directors tenure 1.780 17.067 
 
1.953 15.110 
D&E ownership -68.598 899.700 
 
-76.945 805.400 
Blockholders  -15.885 526.200 
 
-13.656 444.900 
Chairman-CEO -21.255 195.400 
 
-28.432 133.000 
Outside directors -89.548 798.400 
 
-122.500 570.400 
Tobin’s q 9.784 156.300 
 
12.955 114.700 
Leverage 83.664 1391.600 
 
100.900 1074.600 
ROA -212.700 2097.100 
 
-318.400 2646.700 
FCF 98.862 1108.400 
 
132.100 1574.700 
N 66     66   
Model Chi 
square 
0.321     0.385   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.
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Table 13: Regression of CARS for hostile bidders on explanatory variables 
This table reports the results of three regression models for hostile bidders in three day [-1, 1] 
window. The dependent variables are the three year lagged buy-and-hold abnormal return. The 
independent variables include Deal value, a dummy variable that equal to one if the M&A deal 
financed fully or partially with stock( Stock deal), log of book value of total assets (Firm size), 
market value of assets over book value of assets (Tobin’s q), book value of debts over market 
value of total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), Free cash flow (FCF), a dummy equals 
1 if one if a firm’s total number of directors is bigger than the median value of other firms’ board 
directors( Board size), directors’ average age (Director age), directors average tenure (Director 
tenure), the percentage of common stock ownership held by directors and executives as a group 
(D&E ownership), the percentage of common stock ownership of those who own beneficially 
more than five percent of any class of the company's voting securities (Blockholders), the 
percentage of outside directors (Outside-director), and the dummy variable that equals to one if 
the chairman also serves as the CEO in a firm (Chairman-CEO). 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Coefficient Standard errors   Coefficient Standard errors   Coefficient Standard  errors 















Firm size  -0.002 -0.110 
 
   
-0.011 -0.540 
Tobin's q 0.010 -0.290 
 
   
0.014 -0.270 
Leverage 0.042 -0.400 
 
   
0.046 -0.220 
ROA 0.188 -0.570 
 
   
0.131 -0.260 
FCF -0.218 -0.530 
 
   
-0.051 -0.080 
Board size 
























Outside directors  














 Adjusted R^2 -0.178   -0.030   -0.265  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively
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Table 14: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions  Data sources 
 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated 
using the market model. CRSP/Eventus 
Stock price run-up 
For short term Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), that's 
during the 200 trading days ending two months before the 
announcement date with CRSP value-weighted return as the 
market index.  In the long run, BHAR of 1 year, 2 year and 3 
year are used.  CRSP 
Panel B: Firm and deal characteristics  
Firm Size Log of book value of total assets Compustat 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets over book value of assets Compustat 
Leverage Book value of debts over market value of total assets Compustat 
ROA 
Operating income before depreciation, scaled by book value 
of assets Compustat 
FCF 
Operating income before depreciation  - interest expenses  -
income taxes  - capital expenditures , scaled by book value of 
total assets Compustat 
Stock deal 
Indicator variable: one for deals financed partially or fully 
with stock, zero otherwise SDC 
Deal size Log of Acquirer deal value SDC 
Relative deal value Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity  SDC&Compustat 









Indicate variable: one if the total number of directors is bigger 

















Fraction of bidder's common stock held by the largest 







Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the hostile bidders 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
turnover announcement date with the 61 days window [-30, 30], using equally weighted market 
index returns as a benchmark. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for white knight 
 The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
turnover announcement date with the 61 days window [-30, 30], using equally weighted market 





Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Targets  
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
turnover announcement date with the 61 days window [-30, 30], using equally weighted market 














Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the targets and the hostile bidders  
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
bidding announcement date, using equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark. Series 
1 depicts the trend of CARs for the hostile bidders 30 days before and after the announcement 














Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the targets and white knight 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
bidding announcement date, using equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark. Series 
1 depicts the trend of CARs for white knight 30 days before and after the announcement date 














Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the hostile bidders and white knight 
The sample period of short-term stock returns is thirty days before through thirty days after the 
bidding announcement date, using equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark. Series 
1 depicts the trend of CARs for white knight 30 days before and after the announcement date 
while series 2 is for the hostile bidders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
